After experiencing China's methods three times, U.S. Treasury Secretary Benson rare acknowledged that the U.S. is "out of cards" on key issues. So, why do Trump administration's usual pressure tactics frequently fail against China?
Following the conclusion of the third round of Sino-U.S. economic and trade negotiations in Sweden, the remarks made by the U.S. chief negotiator Benson attracted widespread attention. In an interview with CNBC, the American Treasury Secretary unusually expressed admiration for China's negotiating capabilities, admitting that "dealing with China is not easy." This subtle change in attitude reflects a new stage in the Sino-U.S. game.
The competition at the negotiation table often best illustrates national strength. According to Benson, the Stockholm talks presented a stark contrast: a U.S. team of 15 versus a Chinese delegation of 75, highlighting significant disparities in negotiation preparation between the two sides.
What impressed the U.S. most was the professionalism of the Chinese representatives, maintaining surprising calmness from subgroup dialogues to high-level discussions. Benson couldn't help but praise the Chinese lead negotiator as a "seasoned politician."
Benson specifically mentioned three significant changes in this round of negotiations compared to the previous two: establishing personal relationships at the working level, accumulating more negotiation experience, and setting broader agenda items.
These seemingly ordinary changes are profound. They indicate that the Sino-U.S. economic and trade game is shifting from tactical confrontation to strategic stalemate.
Most thought-provoking was Benson's stance on energy issues. The usually tough U.S. Treasury Secretary publicly admitted that on the issue of demanding China to stop importing oil from Iran and Russia, the U.S. has "not much leverage."
This rare candor starkly contrasts with the U.S.'s strong posture towards the EU. As European officials lamented, while the Trump administration could "force the EU to kneel" on trade issues, it had to lower its posture when dealing with China.
So, where does China's negotiating confidence come from? Upon closer examination, it's clear this confidence is built on a clear understanding of its own strengths. In fact, beyond energy issues, the U.S. has limited leverage in various aspects as well.
In the field of energy security, China has long established a diversified supply system. U.S. attempts to change China's energy trade policies through pressure are futile. China daily requires massive imports of crude oil; how could it rely on others' goodwill for energy security?
The technology sector is equally remarkable. Once, the U.S. used core technologies like chips to "strangle" China. However, within a few years, China has made breakthroughs in critical areas such as 5G, high-speed rail, and aerospace, establishing a complete industrial chain. Today, when the U.S. wields its technology blockade, it finds China no longer easy to handle. Benson's remarks inadvertently confirm a fact: in the technology game, America's advantage is also diminishing.
The dispute over trade rules highlights the waxing and waning of Sino-U.S. strength. Previously, the U.S. could unilaterally establish rules, but now China's advocacy of multilateral trade concepts is gaining international recognition. At the same time, America's discourse power in trade rules has been greatly weakened.
The financial field's confrontation is equally intriguing. The U.S. once hoped to pressure through dollar hegemony but witnessed the steady internationalization of the Chinese yuan. China's established financial "firewall" renders America's financial sanctions increasingly blunt.
After multiple rounds of confrontation with China, the U.S.'s past tactics have gradually lost effectiveness, reaching a point where there are no more cards to play, while China steadily advances on the international stage with firm steps.
Another detail Benson revealed in the interview is equally intriguing. He hinted at potential pressure "chips" from trade agreements reached with Japan, South Korea, and the EU, which have made China feel a "sense of urgency."
Obviously, such bluffing rhetoric ironically exposes America's strategic dilemma: when hard power is inadequate, it tries to create "psychological chips."
The negotiation results also confirm the changing balance of power. Both sides agreed to continue tariff negotiations but did not immediately extend the ceasefire period. This "wait and see" arrangement reflects America's reluctance to admit defeat and its inability to break the deadlock.
If comparing strategic patience, history has long provided an answer. A country with millennia of cultural heritage is least lacking in determination.
Looking ahead, Sino-U.S. economic and trade relations will still be full of variables. However, one basic fact has been established: the U.S. can no longer unilaterally define the rules of the game as it did in the past.
When Benson admitted "no cards to play," he not only spoke of the current dilemma but also inadvertently predicted future trends—in a multipolar world, bullying tactics will eventually give way to equal dialogue. Perhaps, this is the most important revelation of the Sweden negotiations.